Title:	The Labor Market Effects of Regulating Platform Work
DNr:	NAISS 2026/4-600
Project Type:	NAISS Small
Principal Investigator:	Álvaro Jañez Garcia <Alvaro.Janez.Garcia@hhs.se>
Affiliation:	Handelshögskolan i Stockholm
Duration:	2026-04-01 – 2026-10-01
Classification:	50201
Homepage:	https://ajanez.github.io/
Keywords:

Abstract

Scientific motivation Digital platform companies typically operate through a controversial business model that relies on subcontracting workers as independent contractors rather than dependent employees. This practice provides flexibility in working hours and lowers the barriers to entry into the labor market for platform workers. However, this comes at the expense of reducing social protection such as wage bargaining, fixed working schedules, or social security coverage. Recent regulatory developments in European (e.g., Spanish Law 12/2021 or EU Directive 2024/2831) and Latin American (e.g., Law 21431 in Chile) countries reflect these concerns. Exploiting these policy changes, this research project quantifies the labor market effects of regulating platform work using a structural model that captures the trade-offs described above. Computational requirements The project requires extensive computational resources for: (1) estimating structural parameters through simulated method of moments, requiring thousands of model simulations; (2) computing equilibrium outcomes through fixed-point iterations; and (3) performing counterfactual policy simulations. I process labor force surveys and administrative datasets, containing hundreds of thousands of individual-level observations annually.